This is an edited version of the speech delivered by L Viswanathan, Partner at Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, Mumbai, for the ‘AMFI Knowledge Series Webinar’ earlier this year. The lecture was originally addressed to mutual fund distributors, and this published version has been adapted for a wider audience. ¹

I want to begin with a simple proposition. In financial services, trust is not an accessory. An investor who does not trust the system will not participate in it, no matter how attractive the returns, how elegant the product design, or how robust the regulatory architecture is.

At a moment when mutual funds are becoming one of the principal vehicles of investing in India, the real question is not whether mis-selling is unlawful, undesirable, or reputationally costly. It is: how do we collectively ensure that investor confidence grows alongside the industry? How do we build systems, habits, and standards that make mis-selling not just impermissible, but genuinely difficult to occur?

Because when confidence weakens, it can travel backwards through the entire project of financial inclusion and push investors away from formal investing and back towards the comfort of physical assets, informal savings channels, and financial decisions driven by mistrust rather than informed participation.

Mis-Selling and the Mutual Fund Industry 

The Indian mutual fund industry’s Assets Under Management (AUM) has grown more than six-fold in a decade, from ₹12.63 lakh crore in February 2016 to ₹82.03 lakh crore in February 2026, with an almost three-fold expansion in the last five years. The total number of folios as of February 2026 stood at 27.06 crore and monthly Systematic Investment Plan inflows for February 2026 were ₹29,845 crore.²

There is a country-wide shift in savings behaviour: from holding wealth in physical assets to allocating it to financial instruments; from passive saving to active investing; from seeing markets as distant and intimidating to seeing them as part of ordinary household financial planning.

This is why the recent observation of Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI) Whole-Time Member Amarjeet Singh that mutual funds are now at the centre of democratising wealth creation in India is so important.³ Democratising wealth creation does not merely mean more people buying more products. It means more people participating in capital markets in a manner that is informed, suitable, and sustainable. Who makes that possible? It is the manufacturer who designs the product for the investor’s need, and in very large measure, it is the distributor, the person who sits with the investor, explains the product, and helps translate financial complexity into a decision the investor can understand and own.

When a first-time investor from a Tier-2 city entrusts a portion of family savings to a mutual fund recommendation, more than the scheme brochure, risk-o-meter, brand of the AMC, or the regulator, that investor is relying on the conduct and integrity of the person making the recommendation. They are relying on the ecosystem’s integrity. The quality of advice in the last mile is not peripheral but the foundation of the industry’s social licence to grow.

Mis-selling is not a novel problem. But the intensity of regulatory and policy attention around market conduct, investor protection, digital promotion, and intermediary accountability has increased sharply in recent years. We are therefore at an important inflection point. The industry should lead this conversation, set its own standards, and demonstrate that self-regulation works. That would be a far better outcome than waiting for conduct failures to trigger more prescriptive regulation.

The regulatory terrain that addresses mis-selling too has become significantly clearer over the years. In December 2025, at the launch of the Past Risk and Return Verification Agency (PaRRVA) system, SEBI Chairman Tuhin Kanta Pandey stated that credible performance data is critical to managing investor expectations and promoting responsible investing. He warned that ‘finfluencers’ and unregistered entities often lure investors with exaggerated or fabricated returns. In this context, he described PaRRVA as a structural safeguard against mis-selling, linking the initiative to SEBI’s broader agenda of investor protection and market integrity.⁴

On 6 February 2026, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies, announcing its decision to issue comprehensive instructions to regulated entities on advertising, marketing, and sales of financial products and services and citing the need to ensure that third-party products sold at bank counters are well-suited to customer needs and commensurate with individual risk appetites. ⁵ On the same day, RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra stated that the bank will issue draft guidelines on mis-selling as part of its consumer protection agenda. The central bank has now placed mis-selling squarely within its regulatory priorities, having released the said draft just a few days later.⁶

In February 2026, SEBI Whole-Time Member Amarjeet Singh highlighted that mis-selling erodes investor trust and undermines household wealth creation; distributors often push products based on commissions rather than suitability; and, critically, intermediaries must act as fiduciaries, prioritising investor interest over sales targets.⁷

Most recently, the finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman stated that mis-selling would constitute an offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, signalling that the government views mis-selling not merely as a regulatory infraction but as conduct attracting criminal liability.⁸

The collective weight of all these statements is unmistakable: mis-selling is a matter of national policy attention. But the corollary is equally important: an industry that demonstrates it can govern itself on this front will earn enormous credibility with regulators, with government, and most importantly, with investors.

Drivers and Impacts of Mis-Selling

Below are the structural factors that create the conditions for mis-selling, because understanding the drivers is the first step to addressing them.

1. Commission

The dominant distribution model in India’s mutual fund industry has historically been commission-driven. A distributor who recommends a high-commission product earns more than one who recommends the most suitable product. That misalignment between distributor compensation and investor outcome is not necessarily a failure of individual ethics. It is a structural design problem. It is convenient for AMCs, because commission-driven distribution scales rapidly. It creates pressure on distributors, because the economics of the profession rewards volume over judgement. And it is invisible to the investor, who usually has no way of knowing whether the product was recommended because it was the best fit or because it paid the highest trail.

The consequences of these structural pressures are well-documented. In some cases, products that maximise commissions rather than investor returns are recommended. Portfolios are churned; investments are switched from one scheme to another not because the investor’s needs have changed, but because each switch generates fresh commission. Bonds are mis-sold as fixed deposits to investors who believe they are placing their savings in a secure, principal-protected instrument, when in reality they are assuming credit and market risks they neither understood nor consented to.

But commission has a legitimate function: it is a way of compensating the distributor for the service of identifying, advising, and onboarding investors who might otherwise never participate in capital markets. The problem is not the existence of commission but the absence of adequate safeguards, through caps, disclosures, suitability obligations, and genuine oversight, to ensure that commission does not become the primary driver of the recommendation.

2. Problems Faced by AMCs

AMCs face a set of practical challenges in addressing mis-selling.

First, there is a persistent lack of hard evidence of mis-selling at the last mile. The point-of-sale interaction between the distributor and the investor is, in most cases, undocumented and unobserved by the AMC, making it exceedingly difficult to establish, after the fact, what was said, what was promised, and what was disclosed.

Second, AMCs lack direct oversight over the last-mile selling efforts of their distributors. The distributor operates independently, often across multiple AMCs, so any one AMC does not have real-time visibility into how its products are being presented to investors.

Third, there is the sheer question of scale: how does an AMC meaningfully police or exercise oversight over lakhs of distributors, spread across the country, each conducting dozens of investor interactions daily?

Fourth, the question must be asked whether AMCs are genuinely strengthening and organising their internal set-up for that oversight by investing in the systems, personnel, and processes required to monitor last-mile conduct at scale or whether oversight remains a commitment rather than an operational reality.

And fifth, notwithstanding all these challenges, the distributor network remains the AMC’s primary driver of growth, which creates an inherent tension between the commercial imperative to maintain and expand distribution relationships and the governance imperative to hold those same distributors accountable when their conduct falls short.

3. Fragmented Regulatory Jurisdiction

Mis-selling in financial services in India has also persisted, in part, because of jurisdictional fragmentation. SEBI regulates mutual funds and investment advisers. The Insurance Development and Regulatory Authority (IRDAI) regulates insurance products. The RBI regulates banks and their conduct in distributing financial products. Mis-selling often occurs in the grey zones between these jurisdictions; products bundled with credit facilities, insurance sold at bank counters, mutual funds recommended by bankers functioning as distributors. This is not an abstract regulatory point. When accountability is diffused across multiple regulators, the pressure to tighten standards at each individual point of contact only increases.

The overlap creates accountability gaps. When a bank’s relationship manager sells an unsuitable mutual fund product, who is responsible—whether it is the AMC, the bank, or the regulator. The answer, in current practice, is often unclear. When accountability is unclear, the regulatory response tends to be broader and more prescriptive, which affects everyone in the distribution chain.

The finance minister herself has drawn attention to the regulatory overlap between RBI and IRDAI and the mis-selling of insurance at bank counters as a serious concern, signalling that the problem is recognised at the highest levels of policymaking.⁹ RBI, SEBI, and IRDAI too are aligned in their recognition of mis-selling as a cross-regulatory problem.¹⁰ That alignment means the regulatory net is tightening across all channels of financial product distribution.

4. Emerging Risks in the Digital Distribution Landscape

The dawn of this era of finfluencers, financial influencers on social media, has created an entirely new channel of quasi-advice that operates largely outside the regulatory perimeter. The individuals behind such financial social media channels reach millions of retail investors, particularly young and first-time investors, with return claims and product recommendations that carry none of the disclosure obligations, suitability requirements, or accountability that apply to registered intermediaries.

Regulatory intervention to ban finfluencers is a protective measure from SEBI to help strengthen the formal distribution channel.¹¹ SEBI has also asked brokers and mutual funds to severe links with unregistered finfluencers who push stock tips and paid training with unverified returns on social media platforms.¹² SEBI’s AI surveillance tool, Sudarshan, has taken down 1.2 lakh misleading finfluencer posts, indicating the scale of the problem.¹³

Then there are digital investment apps and algorithm-driven recommendation engines that suggest products based on inputs that bear little relationship to a rigorous suitability assessment. A few questions about age, income, and self-assessed risk tolerance—answered in under two minutes—generate a portfolio recommendation that may determine the trajectory of an investor’s savings for years. The regulatory challenge here is considerable. How do you apply fiduciary standards to an algorithm? Who is accountable when the algorithm recommends an unsuitable product—the developer who coded it, the platform that deployed it, or the AMC whose product was recommended? These are not hypothetical questions. They are questions that will define the next decade of investor protection regulation. These apps, which pose as investment advisers and distributors, will soon meet the same regulatory fate.

Currently, every active exchange-registered trading member must file half‑yearly reports on artificial intelligence/machine learning usage via the Enhanced Supervision Portal. ¹⁴ This information will help the regulator assess the risks associated with such systems, so it can introduce appropriate regulatory safeguards.

5. Investor Vulnerability

All of these structural and technological factors operate against a backdrop of significant investor vulnerability.

The ongoing financialisation of household savings, growing participation from first-time investors, and increasing preference for mutual funds, which are seen as a transparent, well-regulated investment vehicle, has played a meaningful role in AUM growth. But the corollary is that many of these new investors are entering markets they do not understand, relying on intermediaries they cannot independently evaluate, and making decisions on the basis of trust rather than informed consent. They sign documents they have not read. They accept risk disclosures they do not comprehend. They invest in products with names that suggest safety—anything with ‘balanced’, ‘conservative’, ‘retirement’, without understanding that these labels do not guarantee outcomes. The gap between the legal fiction of informed consent and the lived reality of investor decision-making is, in many cases, enormous.

The expansion of financial services to Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities has broadened the investor base enormously. But it has also meant that the sophistication of the average investor has not kept pace with that of the products being sold.

Regulatory Stance on Mis-Selling

Here is a brief look at the existing regulatory philosophy and framework on mis-selling in India.

1. SEBI’s Evolving Regulatory Philosophy

SEBI’s approach to investor protection has undergone a fundamental shift in the past few years. The earlier model was disclosure-based, requiring entities to disclose information and letting the market take care of the rest. The working assumption was that an informed investor was a protected investor.

That model has now been substantially revised. The evidence suggests that disclosure alone is insufficient when the investor cannot meaningfully process the information disclosed. SEBI has therefore moved towards proactive market conduct regulation: a model in which the regulator sets affirmative standards for how intermediaries must behave, monitors those standards through data-driven supervision, and enforces deviations from them regardless of investor complaints.

This is a significant philosophical shift. It means that doing nothing wrong is no longer sufficient. The expectation is that distributors actively do things right, documenting suitability, disclosing conflicts, and ensuring that every recommendation can withstand scrutiny.

2. Regulatory Architecture

Curbing mis-selling requires coordinated action by three key stakeholders in the mutual fund ecosystem: SEBI, the regulator; AMCs, who are the architects of the mutual fund schemes and establish distribution channels; and intermediaries, consisting of mutual fund distributors, investment advisers, and stockbrokers who interface directly with retail investors.

There is a substantial regulatory framework in place, and it continues to evolve. The tools have gotten sharper. The surveillance has become deeper. The enforcement appetite has become greater than it has ever been. This is reflected in the regulatory tools below, which are already in place or are in the works:

(i) SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations 2026: These regulations represent a major paradigm shift in the regulation of mutual funds in India, replacing the preexisting framework under the regulations of 1996 with one that has a stronger focus on transparency, investor protection, rationalisation of costs, and ease of compliance. The new regulations also rationalise the Base Expense Ratio framework to cap costs more strictly and reduce the scope for hidden distributor incentives. The regulatory environment is moving decisively towards greater transparency in costs and commissions.

(ii) PaRRVA: SEBI launched the new, independent body PaRRVA as a pilot in December 2025 in partnership with the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and CareEdge Ratings. India is the first country to develop such a standard framework for checking investment performance claims. This system verifies past returns and risk numbers that intermediaries show in ads, pitch decks, and communication, including investment advisers, research analysts, portfolio managers, and algo providers. Investors can compare verified performance data across registered intermediaries in a standardised format, allowing them to make informed investment decisions. The aim is to stop the proliferation of exaggerated or fake performance charts that can mislead small investors.

(iii) AI-Driven Surveillance: SEBI’s AI surveillance tool Sudarshan, as mentioned earlier, has identified and taken down 1.2 lakh misleading finfluencer posts. SEBI also, as conveyed at the Moneycontrol Mutual Fund Summit in February 2026, disclosed that it is developing AI tools specifically to detect mis-selling patterns in distributor behaviour, including unusual churn patterns and suitability mismatches.⁹

(iv) RBI: The RBI has issued the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Responsible Business Conduct) Second Amendment Directions 2026, which will come into effect from 1 January 2027. The Directions prohibit compulsory bundling of third-party financial products/services with a bank’s own product/service, prohibit the use of dark patterns in the user interfaces of banks and their DSAs/DMAs, and require explicit consent for each product/service offered or sold to a customer. Where mis-selling is established, banks will be required to refund the entire amount paid by the customer and compensate the customer for any loss arising from such mis-selling, in accordance with the bank’s approved policy.¹⁵

The Role of the Industry

1. What the Association of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) Is Already Doing

(i) Code of Conduct: AMFI, the primary self-regulatory body for AMCs in India, has a Code of Conduct for Mutual Fund Distributors that sets clear standards of professional behaviour and industry standards for distribution practices. It has been conducting investor awareness campaigns for many years and reached crores of Indians.¹⁶ These reflect a genuine institutional commitment to raising the bar.

(ii) Reporting Mechanism: AMFI has also established a reporting mechanism for the documentation of mis-selling incidents, and it publishes reports on actions taken against errant mutual fund distributors.¹⁷

2. Possible Areas of Improvement

(i) Centralised Mis-Selling Complaint Repository: The industry could consider establishing a searchable database of distributor misconduct outcomes, which will serve as a useful reference point for investors and stakeholders assessing a distributor’s track record.

(ii) Independent Oversight Mechanism from the Industry: There may also be merit in exploring an independent oversight mechanism for mis-selling-related disputes between investors and mutual fund distributors—one that could offer the speed and accessibility that formal proceedings often cannot.

3. Areas Where Participants May Strengthen Distribution Practices

(i) Leverage Use of AI for Conducting Checks: Participants, on the other hand, may consider leveraging AI tools to conduct social media checks on distributors, monitoring for misleading claims or conduct inconsistent with expected standards. Robust oversight among the distributors themselves, via a system that identifies and removes bad actors protects the reputation of other honest distributors, will help.

(ii) Treating Complaints as Early Warning Signs: Investor complaints are not merely administrative burdens to be resolved and closed; they are data points. The AMFI mis-selling reports record the number of complaints received, the nature of each case, and the corrective actions taken. The most common complaint types include unauthorised switch transactions and redemptions, forging of investor signatures, and misrepresentation of scheme features. Stakeholders may benefit from treating complaint data as inputs that help highlight systemic oversight, recognising that multiple complaints against the same distributor or complaints of a similar nature across different distributors can serve as early warning signals warranting further attention.

(iii) Re-examining Scheme Complexity: Some schemes used to be marketed around life goals, such as retirement or children’s education, giving the appearance of guaranteed results, even while they were still market-linked investments. SEBI, in the 2026 Mutual Funds Regulations, eliminated the solution-oriented category to disallow open-ended plans from asserting goal-based status in the absence of structural design. AMCs may wish to take the regulatory signal from this into account and ensure that complex schemes are made for and marketed to sophisticated investors and simpler schemes target a wider investor base.

(iv) Embedding Suitability into Product Design: Suitability need not be an afterthought at the point of sale. There is value in building suitability considerations into the product approval process itself. Before a scheme is launched, ask: for which investor profile is this appropriate and how will that be communicated to distributors?

(v) Board-Level Awareness: Mis-selling may warrant attention at the board level of AMCs, not merely as a compliance statistic but as a substantive governance matter. Boards that receive meaningful reporting on the nature, volume, and patterns of mis-selling complaints are better positioned to identify systemic risks and support corrective action. The objective is not to burden boards with operational detail, but to ensure that the fiduciary apex of the scheme structure has visibility into a risk that directly affects unit-holder confidence and that they can take action to mitigate such risks.

4. Framework for Distributors: What Professional Excellence Demands

There are various steps distributors may take for self-regulation: (i) Distributors must engage in proactive portfolio reviews and investor communication when market conditions change or when the investor’s life circumstances need a reassessment. (ii) The investor is entitled to know how the distributor is compensated. (iii) Documenting the rationale for every recommendation made not only allows the distributor to provide a defence of a sale but also forces them to reason more carefully. AI tools may be leveraged for meticulous record-keeping. (iv) Distributors must update themselves about the products, which keep evolving and are complex, by staying informed about SEBI circulars and AMFI guidelines, implications of new regulations, and developing the ability to explain complex product features to investors in plain language.

5. The Role of Technology in Self-Regulation

Technology is not merely a risk factor but also one of the most powerful tools available for self-regulation. AI and machine learning tools can detect unusual churn patterns in distributor books, identify concentration risk, and flag suitability mismatches between an investor’s stated profile and the products they have been sold. SEBI is already deploying such tools for supervisory purposes. There is no reason why AMCs and AMFI cannot deploy equivalent tools for their own oversight functions; moreover, regulators will increasingly expect them to. Digital audit trails for point-of-sale interactions—whether conducted in person, over video call, or through an app—are a powerful accountability mechanism.

The Way Forward: Structural Reforms For a Sustainable Ecosystem 

There is, at present, a structural gap in the regulatory oversight of mutual fund distributors, and it is a gap that must be acknowledged candidly before it can be addressed. Mutual fund distributors are registered with AMFI and are subject to its Code of Conduct. But while AMFI can cancel registrations, it cannot levy financial penalties. It can issue guidelines; it cannot enforce them with the graduated consequences that effective oversight requires. The power to take regulatory action—to impose penalties, issue directions, and initiate adjudication proceedings—lies with SEBI.

But SEBI, as a regulator overseeing the entirety of India’s securities markets, cannot realistically undertake direct, granular supervision of over two lakh active mutual fund distributors spread across the length and breadth of this country. The scale of the distribution network is simply too vast for a single regulator to monitor at the point-of-sale level. The result is a gap, and that gap is not good for anyone. It is not good for investors, because misconduct may go unaddressed. It is not good for honest distributors, because bad actors operate without consequence and tarnish the entire profession. And it is not good for the industry, because it invites more prescriptive regulation.

This gap has persisted for some time, and it can no longer be treated as a matter of academic interest. The evidence is in the data, of suitability mismatches that SEBI’s surveillance tools are now detecting with increasing precision. Here is the opportunity: if the industry addresses this problem from within, through structural reform, meaningful self-regulation, and genuine accountability, it will earn the credibility to shape its own regulatory future. If it does not, the regulator will have no choice but to intervene more directly. The window for industry-led solutions is open.

The first suggestion is this: consideration may be given to equipping AMFI with the authority to impose graduated consequences on mutual fund distributors found to have engaged in mis-selling. At present, AMFI’s enforcement toolkit is limited to cancellation of registration, which is a measure that, while significant, is binary. A graduated enforcement system with proportionate penalties, suspension for defined periods, and disgorgement of commissions earned through mis-sold transactions could serve the interests of the distribution community better by ensuring that consequences are proportionate, minor lapses are corrected rather than becoming career-ending, and the most serious misconduct is dealt with decisively. The details of such a framework would, of course, require careful deliberation.

The alternative, which merits equally serious consideration, is this: SEBI may consider bringing mutual fund distributors within a regulatory framework that provides equivalent investor protections to those applicable to investment advisers. The case for regulatory harmonisation does not depend on functional equivalence between intermediaries; it depends on the position of the investor, who deals with the consequences of an unsuitable recommendation regardless of whether the person who made it was classified as a distributor or an adviser. SEBI Chairman Pandey, in his address on 16 March 2026, announced that a Working Group has been constituted to review the extant regulatory framework of mutual fund distributors and harmonise the overlap, if any, between mutual fund distributors and investment advisers. The outcome of that Working Group’s deliberations may well define the future regulatory architecture of mutual fund distribution in India.

The second suggestion is more difficult, but no less important: AMCs should bear meaningful accountability for the conduct of their distribution networks. The distributor sells the AMC’s product, under the AMC’s brand, pursuant to an empanelment arrangement that the AMC establishes and controls. And the investor typically perceives the distributor as a representative of the AMC, not as an independent person. However, distributors are not employees, they operate independently across multiple AMCs, and the point-of-sale conversation takes place entirely outside the AMC’s direct oversight. A balance must therefore be struck with precision: AMC accountability should not mean that every instance of distributor misconduct automatically results in penalty, but it should mean that where an AMC has failed to exercise meaningful oversight, it cannot find shelter behind the formal independence of the distributor relationship.

If these measures prove insufficient and if mis-selling continues to be a persistent feature despite these reforms, the distribution system itself will come under pressure for fundamental overhaul, potentially requiring AMCs to either bear full responsibility for their products sold by distributors or establish their own direct distribution presence, bringing the distribution function in-house. That would fundamentally alter the economics of mutual fund distribution, diminish the role of the very community that has been instrumental in bringing mutual funds to millions of Indian households, and reduce its reach in smaller towns and rural areas. The industry would be far better served by demonstrating, through its own actions, that the existing distribution architecture can be made to work; that AMFI, armed with adequate oversight powers, can maintain standards; that AMCs, motivated by genuine accountability, can design systems that support good distribution practices; and that the mutual fund distribution community can be trusted to place investor interest above commercial convenience.

Conclusion

The regulatory signals from SEBI and, increasingly, from the RBI as well are consistent and reinforcing. Mis-selling is being monitored with data-driven tools and is attracting enforcement action. The direction of regulatory philosophy is unmistakably leaning towards fiduciary standards in financial product distribution.

But alongside those signals is another equally important one: the regulators want this industry to succeed. They want financial inclusion to deepen and mutual funds to reach every corner of this country. They know that cannot happen without a distribution community that investors trust.

The question is not whether standards will be enforced. The question is whether the industry will meet them because it is required to or because it has chosen to.

Those are very different things. The first produces minimal compliance. The second genuine trust. And investor trust, in this industry, is everything. Once lost, it is extraordinarily difficult to rebuild. We saw what happened to the debt fund space in 2020. But we also know from the numbers we examined in the beginning how much trust has been built over the last decade. A six-fold growth in AUM. Twenty-seven crore folios. These numbers were not built by regulators or by AMCs alone but also by distributors.

1. I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Naman Lodha, Senior Associate, Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, and Nankee Arora, Associate, Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, in helping me prepare this speech.[↩]
2. ‘AMFI Monthly Note’ (AMFI, February 2026) <https://www.amfiindia.com/uploads/AMFI_Monthly_Note_Feb2026_07ce65814b.pdf> accessed 3 July 2026; ‘Indian Mutual Fund Industry’s Average Assets Under Management (AAUM) stood at ₹83.43 Lakh Crore (INR 83.43 Trillion)’ (AMFI) <https://www.amfiindia.com/articles/indian-mutual> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
3. Amarjeet Singh, WTM, SEBI, ‘From Savings to Solutions: Powering Har Ghar Mutual Fund with Purpose and Protection’ (Speech at the Moneycontrol Mutual Fund Summit, 17 February 2026) <https://www.sebi.gov.in/media-and-notifications/speeches/feb-2026/address-by-shri-amarjeet-singh-wtm-sebi-at-the-moneycontrol-mutual-fund-summit-_99903.html> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
4. Tuhin Kanta Pandey, SEBI Chairman, ‘Launch of the Past Risk and Return Verification Agency’ (Speech at the Launch of PaRRVA, 8 December 2025) <https://www.sebi.gov.in/media-and-notifications/speeches/dec-2025/address-by-chairman-at-the-launch-of-parrva_98215.html> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
5. Reserve Bank of India, Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies (6 February 2026) <https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=62171> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
6. Reserve Bank of India, Governor’s Statement (6 February 2026) <https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PressRelease/PDFs/PR2054C84A8B485FE04BC184F9FFF33C33C3A1.PDF> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
7. Amarjeet Singh, WTM, SEBI, ‘Speaking Notes of Shri Amarjeet Singh’ (Speech at the Foundation of Independent Financial Associates [FIFA] 10th Annual Conference, 13 February 2026) <https://www.sebi.gov.in/media-and-notifications/speeches/feb-2026/address-by-shri-amarjeet-singh-wtm-sebi-at-the-foundation-of-independent-financial-associates-fifa-annual-conference_99767.html> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
8. ‘Mis-selling an Offence under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Banks Should Concentrate on Core Business: FM Nirmala Sitharaman’ (Economic Times, 23 February 2026) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/mis-selling-an-offence-under-bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita-banks-should-concentrate-on-core-business-fm-nirmala-sitharaman/articleshow/128707817.cms?from=mdr> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
9. ibid[↩][↩]
10. Ministry of Finance Government of India, Report of the Committee to Recommend Measures for Curbing Mis-selling and Rationalising Distribution Incentives in Financial Products’ (9 March 2015), Final_Report_Committee_on_Incentive_Structure.pdf> accessed 8 September 2026.[↩]
11. SEBI Regulation, Securities and Exchange Board of India (Intermediaries) (Amendment) Regulations 2024 <https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/aug-2024/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-intermediaries-amendment-regulations-2024_86338.html?> accessed 8 September 2026.[↩]
12. SEBI Circular, Association of Persons Regulated by the Board and Their Agents with Certain
    Persons (22 October 2024) <https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/oct-2024/association-of-persons-regulated-by-the-board-and-their-agents-with-certain-persons_87837.html?> accessed 8 September 2026.[↩]
13. Sankunni K, ‘SEBI Takes Down 1.2 Lakh Finfluencer Posts, Deploys AI Tool “Sudarshan”: Tuhin Kanta Pandey’ (Fortune India, 2 March 2026) <https://www.fortuneindia.com/markets/sebi-takes-down-12-lakh-finfluencer-posts-deploys-ai-tool-sudarshan-tuhin-kanta-pandey/130865#google_vignette> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
14. NSE Circular, Reporting for Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) Applications and Systems Offered and Used by Market Intermediaries (1 April 2026) <https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/content/circulars/COMP73568.pdf?> accessed 8 September 2026.[↩]
15. Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Responsible Business Conduct) Second Amendment Directions 2026 (15 June 2026) <https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=13485&Mode=0> accessed 8 September 2026> accessed 8 September 2026.[↩]
16. ‘AMFI Master Circular for Mutual Fund Distributors’ (AMFI, as updated on 14 January 2026) <https://www.amfiindia.com/uploads/AMFI_Master_Cicular_for_MF_Ds_3c7f5ee44f.pdf> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]
17. ‘Report on Cases of Mis-Selling/Mis-Conduct by the MFDs Reported by AMC’ (AMFI) <https://www.amfiindia.com/locate-distributor/list-of-arn-misselling> accessed 3 July 2026.[↩]