The NLS Forum curates pioneering research and current developments in the fields of law, public policy, social sciences and humanities.
Our work bridges academic scholarship, legal practice and
civil society discourse.
We present the University blog and five student journal blogs, where leading scholarship from around the world is edited by our faculty, researchers and students. To submit your work, please refer to the submission guidelines provided for each blog.
When Must The Supreme Court Answer? Re-Thinking Discretion Under Article 143 Through The ‘Institutional Mechanics Effect’
August 12, 2026
The piece examines how the Supreme Court has exercised discretion under Article 143 across 16 Presidential References, focusing particularly on when it has refused to answer questions. It identifies an 'Institutional Mechanics Effect' where there is an apparent tendency to constitute larger benches and decide faster when references concern core constitutional institutions, especially federalism and separation of powers. It ultimately argues that federal disputes falling within Article 143(2) should attract a mandatory duty to answer, although the paper’s interpretation of Article 143(2) and its extension of basic-structure reasoning to advisory jurisdiction remain its key doctrinal vulnerabilities.
A Defensible Result by an Indefensible Route: ANI v. OpenAI and the Limits of Fair Dealing (Part II)
August 30, 2026
This is Part II of a two-part piece critiquing the Delhi High Court’s reasoning in ANI Media Pvt Ltd v OpenAI OpCo LLC. Part I argued that the Court improperly severs “research” from private or personal use and that, in light of Chintamani Rao, Section 52 is not a provision that courts may enlarge through interpretation. This part begins by addressing a counterargument to the latter claim, namely that Chintamani Rao is distinguishable because the Court invoked the doctrine of updating construction to interpret “research” broadly, rather than adding a new category to Section 52. We argue that this application of updating construction was incorrect because the doctrine requires “genuine ambiguity” in the law, which was absent here. We then advance a third argument that, even assuming the Court was correct to interpret Section 52 expansively, its fairness inquiry was inadequate. In particular, we argue that the inquiry omits consideration of the amount and substantiality of the work taken and imports the transformative use doctrine from a different statutory limb without adequate reasoning.
The Illusion of Restraint: The Paradox of Supreme Court Jurisprudence under Article 226 and 227 in Arbitration
August 12, 2026
This paper examines the Supreme Court’s two competing lines of jurisprudence concerning writ interference in arbitral proceedings under Articles 226 and 226. Specifically, it argues that the Court’s ostensibly “restrictive” approach, intended to reduce judicial interference, has paradoxically expanded the scope for intervention by relying on open-ended standards that allow procedural grievances to be reframed as exceptional cases, thereby enabling courts to examine arbitral proceedings on their merits. This paper traces the contradiction of the minimal court intervention promise found in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and compares India’s positions with jurisdictions that have far more precisely defined intervention thresholds.