The NLS Forum curates pioneering research and current developments in the fields of law, public policy, social sciences and humanities.
Our work bridges academic scholarship, legal practice and
civil society discourse.
We present the University blog and five student journal blogs, where leading scholarship from around the world is edited by our faculty, researchers and students. To submit your work, please refer to the submission guidelines provided for each blog.
When Must The Supreme Court Answer? Re-Thinking Discretion Under Article 143 Through The ‘Institutional Mechanics Effect’
August 12, 2026
The piece examines how the Supreme Court has exercised discretion under Article 143 across 16 Presidential References, focusing particularly on when it has refused to answer questions. It identifies an 'Institutional Mechanics Effect' where there is an apparent tendency to constitute larger benches and decide faster when references concern core constitutional institutions, especially federalism and separation of powers. It ultimately argues that federal disputes falling within Article 143(2) should attract a mandatory duty to answer, although the paper’s interpretation of Article 143(2) and its extension of basic-structure reasoning to advisory jurisdiction remain its key doctrinal vulnerabilities.
July 2026: IJLT Tech-Law Bulletin
August 12, 2026
This month's bulletin focuses on MHA's notice for the takedown of blue-tooth app ‘BitChat,’ the Delhi High Court's ruling in the ANI Media v OpenAI case, and the Parliamentary Standing Committee's latest roundtable discussion on Virtual Digital Assets. It was authored by Vanshika Gupta, Samik Basu and Jai Kumar Bohara from the IJLT Editorial Board (2025-26).
The Illusion of Restraint: The Paradox of Supreme Court Jurisprudence under Article 226 and 227 in Arbitration
August 12, 2026
This paper examines the Supreme Court’s two competing lines of jurisprudence concerning writ interference in arbitral proceedings under Articles 226 and 226. Specifically, it argues that the Court’s ostensibly “restrictive” approach, intended to reduce judicial interference, has paradoxically expanded the scope for intervention by relying on open-ended standards that allow procedural grievances to be reframed as exceptional cases, thereby enabling courts to examine arbitral proceedings on their merits. This paper traces the contradiction of the minimal court intervention promise found in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and compares India’s positions with jurisdictions that have far more precisely defined intervention thresholds.