Part II builds on the groundwork established in Part I, by assessing the effects of extending the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to complainants under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It first illustrates how the Supreme Court’s decision in M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran & Ors introduces ambiguity and inconsistency into the Code of Criminal Procedure by creating two parallel and overlapping appellate routes, one requiring special leave under Section 378(4) and the other permitting a direct appeal under Section 372. Thereafter, the authors contend, using P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt Ltd that Section 138 is essentially a civil proceeding with criminal antecedents. Based on this, Part II contends that characterizing Section 138 complainants as “victims” under Section 372 proviso runs the risk of frivolous complaints.