Understanding the UGC Equity Regulations and the Misuse Debate (Part I)

This is Part I of a two-part series on the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026, and the Supreme Court’s decision to stay them. In this part, the authors examine the constitutionality of the Regulations’ definition of caste-based discrimination under Clause 3(c), arguing that the protests against the Regulations overlook the Constitution’s commitment to substantive equality. In Part II, the authors examine the misuse debate and argue that the anxiety pertaining to the misuse of the said regulations is unfounded. 

Introduction 

In the last decade, several caste-marginalised students in Indian universities have died after reporting harassment, exclusion, or humiliation on campus. The tragic deaths of Dalit students, Rohith Vemula, Muthukrishnan, Darshan Solanki, Ayush Ashna and Anil Kumar triggered inquiries, protests, and public debate. Each raised the same uncomfortable question about what everyday institutional life looks like for marginalised caste students within elite campuses. Higher educational institutions in India have long reported formal commitments to equality and non-discrimination. Yet, due to institutional apathy, these commitments have seldom translated into meaningful change. Instead, the language of merit has often been used to gatekeep and hegemonise institutional spaces and reinforce the marginalisation of lower-caste students. According to data tabled by the Ministry of Education in Lok Sabha in December 2024, more than 13,500 Scheduled Caste (‘SC’), Scheduled Tribe (‘ST’), and Other Backward Class (‘OBC’) students have dropped out of Central universities, IITs, and IIMs between 2018-2023. University Grant Commission’s (‘UGC’) records  also show a steep rise in reported caste discrimination complaints between 2019 and 2024. Given these concerns, in fact, the Thorat Committee, which was established to investigate alleged discrimination against SC and ST students at All India Institute of Medical Sciences, explicitly recommended the establishment of a committee to address caste discrimination on college campuses, a proposal which the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 (‘UGC Regulations’) seeks to achieve.

In 2019, a public interest litigation filed by Radhika Vemula and Abeda Salim Tadvi, the mothers of Rohith Vemula and Dr. Payal Tadvi, called for the establishment of a statutory mechanism to curb caste-based discrimination in higher educational institutions. The Supreme Court directed the University Grants Commission to consider stakeholder inputs and frame appropriate regulations. In compliance with these directions, the UGC subsequently notified the UGC Regulations providing for Equal Opportunity Centres and structured grievance redressal mechanisms. The regulations were met with immediate and massive protests, especially from sections of general-category groups. Much of the concern focused on Clause 3(1)(c), which defines caste-based discrimination as “discrimination only on the basis of caste or tribe against the members of the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward classes. ” The source of anxiety identified by these protesting groups is that this provision could lead to one-sided complaint mechanisms and potential misuse.

In response to a petition filed against these regulations, whereby a caste-neutral definition of discrimination was demanded, the Supreme Court ordered that the guidelines be “kept in abeyance” as they “suffer from certain ambiguities, and the possibility of their misuse cannot be ruled out”. The court expressed its reservations with regard to the definition under Clause 3(1)(c) as well, expressing the possibility that not defining caste-based discrimination would be more inclusive, with the CJI even verbally raising the possibilities of divisiveness. Furthermore, the petition also raised, firstly, as to why the regulation omitted the term ‘ragging,’ in such discriminatory context which allows for privileging hierarchies in its treatment of justice and secondly, raised skepticism over the ability of the regulation to protect sub-castes. In doing so, it demanded clarification on the usage of the term “segregation” as used in the guidelines in the context of public spaces such as hostels, classrooms and mentorship groups.

Gautam Bhatia has already criticised the Supreme Court’s stay order in depth. This piece takes the discussion forward by making two central claims. In this first part, we argue that the current protests by dominant caste groups against the definition of caste-based discrimination do not account for the Constitution’s commitment to substantive equality in light of the long history of caste-based disadvantage, and that defining caste discrimination primarily in terms of harm against lower-caste groups is legally and normatively defensible. In Part II of this two-part series, we examine the framework of the Regulations in detail, and argue that the widespread anxiety over misuse of the Regulations is misplaced and is rather a result of the trust deficit faced by marginalised communities.

On the Question of Constitutionality of the UGC Regulations

The current protests and the petition before the Supreme Court ignore an established constitutional vocabulary for substantive equality. The petitioners contended that Clause 3(c) of the UGC Regulations, which defines caste discrimination, was exclusionary given that it ‘excludes’ individuals of the general category.  A mere contention that a provision be made applicable to everyone is inconsistent with Indian constitutional design, given the explicit presence of Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Indian Constitution which allow the state to accord special treatment to the underprivileged. Article 15(4) was enacted as per the first amendment to the constitution to create an exception to Article 29(2) which prohibits the state from discriminating (read as denying admission) in an educational institute on grounds of religion, caste, language or any of them. Article 15(4) therefore, allows the state to make special provisions for the advancement of any socially or backward classes of citizens or for the SCs and STs. Article 16(4) on the other hand allows the state to accord preferential and special treatment to ‘backward class of citizens’ not adequately represented in the context of employment.  This argument of the petitioners is, in fact, emblematic of the reasoning in  The State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan , where it held reservations to be an exception to, rather that a facet of equality.  This normatively conservative approach was reiterated in The General Manager, Southern Railway v Rangachari.  This understanding, however, is characteristic of formal equality, which attempts to treat all individuals equally. On the other hand, substantive equality attempts to account for differences in social structures and seeks to instead focus on addressing systematic historic inequalities. As such, it does not remain colour blind to the differences in needs as required by different communities. It was later, in State of Kerala v NM Thomasthat the court interpreted affirmative action as an emphatic facet of equality, rather than an exception. This was also subsequently upheld by the nine-judge bench in Indra Sawhney v Union of India . As such, the arguments stand no merit in light of our constitutional jurisprudence.

Elsewhere, we argued that even the Court’s current articulation of substantive equality continues to bear traces of formalism. As such, interpreting Clause 3(c) as exclusionary risks reintroducing and regressing to the formal conception of equality. This transition remains inconsistent with the underlying value of transformative constitutionalism. Transformative constitutionalism, is a theory which understands constitutional interpretation to be in pursuance of addressing historical wrongs and dismantling societal barriers to attain substantive equality. As such, a reading as aligned with such conceptions would allow the Court to read Clause 3(c) to be in pursuance of such objectives and effectuate substantive equality, consistent with the Court’s own jurisprudence that bridges exclusion to spheres of equal treatment.

In Justice KS Puttaswamy vs Union of India and Others, Justice Kaul opined that a majoritarian lens to understand and interpret constitution is unsuited and courts must instead, adopt an interpretation which encompasses the ability to pierce societal barriers. This remains congruous with the approach of hierarchising constitutional morality over social morality, as evidenced in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India and Others. A formalistic approach to addressing caste oppression is paradoxical to the goal of the paradigm of equality that the constitution envisages. It posits a superficial understanding of anti – discrimination law and divorces one’s social positioning and attached marginalisation to the intended outcomes of equality.

Furthermore, given that Clause 3(c) defines caste based discrimination as “discrimination only based on caste or tribe against the members of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes,” there are varying questions over its horizontal application, that is, whether a discriminatory conduct as perpetrated by an individual falling within a marginalised caste location as against another caste based minority would fall within the definitional scope of Clause 3(c).

To that end, the authors argue, that the Court must adopt a purposive and advance a horizontal understanding of the clause than a strict interpretation. As Herman Belz argues, fidelity to the text ensures a rights-advancing compliant interpretation, and judicial power must be exercised and not limited to attain such objectives. Such understanding has already found place in Indian jurisprudence by the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in M Nagraj v Union of India. Such purposive interpretation have also been relied on consistently by the Apex Court.

Ambedkar also acknowledges the possibility of such discrimination by theorising ‘graded inequality’ which positions lower castes against each other and allows for intra perpetration of caste-based discrimination. In fact, the Supreme Court has also advanced an understanding that refrains from positioning the lower caste as a monolith group identity, but one where it comes with its own set of hierarchies. As such, adopting such lens would reveal that while the term “caste discrimination” under Clause 3(c) may appear insufficient and under-inclusive, such omission can be addressed by an effective interpretation which acknowledges the distinctions between different sub-castes even when residing within the umbrella location of marginalised caste identity. Such effective and purposive interpretation can also be drawn from the architecture of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 which under Section 3, merely creates a bar against a fellow SC and a ST being an offender and does not extend it to other marginalised castes. As such, the Act envisages an instance where an individual who is not a SC or a ST but nevertheless belonging from a marginalised caste location, has the potential to perpetrate caste-based discrimination against an individual from a similar or relatively worse caste position,

Moreover, the omission of the term “ragging” as is argued must not be read as a diluting the Regulations but the omission is owing to the already complimentary UGC Regulations on ragging. In that light, even reading the question posed by the Court as to whether the term “segregation” points to a separate but equal measure, is erroneous. As Gautam Bhatia argues, the term used herein does not allow for or mandate segregation but merely notes that it be done in a transparent basis, and is in fact, to be read narrowly in light of specialised SC/ST Scholarships and minority student welfare programs.

Even otherwise, the Court’s decision to grant the stay is problematic, when contrasted with a refusal to extend such treatment to acts of the executive, such as to the Aadhar Act and its rules, or more contemporarily, a refusal to extend such a stay order to Special Intensive Revisions thus agreeing to maintain the status quo, which arguably suffer from graver constitutional concerns unlike the present matter.  This differential treatment, in fact, is highly problematic as elaborated in Part II.