Missing Presumptions and Shifted Burdens: The Bihar SIR Judgement and its Implications for Citizenship Adjudication

This piece argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, upholding the Bihar Special Intensive Revision, nullifies the presumption of validity of electoral rolls recognised in Lal Babu Hussein. The Court's distinction between inquisitorial verification and the adjudication of citizenship is inaccurate since its own directions carve a pathway from exclusion from SIR to citizenship determination by an executive authority. In treating every elector as a suspect citizen and shifting the burden of proof onto them, the judgement risks institutionalising a system of citizenship adjudication that is arbitrary, discriminatory, and inconsistent with the rule of law.

Vibha Swaminathan, Ameya Deb

November 21, 2026 18 min read
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In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Election Commission’s Special Intensive Revision  (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar in 2025 – the pilot project for the rest of the country. The SIR, unlike a summary revision of electoral rolls, is done de novo: the primary data is collected afresh, and the older electoral roll is tossed out. As other scholars have pointed out, a revision of electoral rolls necessarily includes deletions and inclusions, and in updating electoral rolls, the Election Commission may find that a person does not qualify for enrolment for reasons of age, residence or citizenship status. This process of enumeration, however, does not confer on the Election Commission the power to determine citizenship status. The SIR process, however, comes dangerously close to doing exactly that.

To uphold the constitutional validity of the Bihar SIR, the Supreme Court attempts to draw a series of conceptual distinctions to get around its main roadblock – Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, a precedent set by a larger bench which has stood for over three decades, on the presumption of validity of electoral rolls.

The result is a judicial sleight of hand that, upon closer scrutiny, implodes under the weight of its own reasoning. The Court relies on a duplicitous understanding of “rebuttable” evidentiary rules to nullify the presumption of validity attached to electoral rolls, thereby legitimising a process that places every elector under a generalised suspicion of foreignness. Indeed, the Court’s attempt to distinguish the process of verification of electors from the process of adjudication of citizenship is contradicted by its own directions, which create a direct pathway from exclusion from the SIR to the determination of citizenship by an executive body. In doing so, the judgement risks institutionalising a model of citizenship adjudication that is arbitrary, discriminatory and inconsistent with the rule of law.

The Presumption of Validity of Electoral Rolls

In Lal Babu Hussein, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court struck down notices issued under Rule 21-A of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, to swathes of people in certain constituencies in Bombay and Delhi. The notices had treated these populations as suspected foreigners, without any prior inquiry into the citizenship status of individual electors. In striking down these notices, the Court held that before a person’s name may be deleted from an electoral roll, even during an intensive revision, the objector or enrolling authority must disclose the basis on which doubt or suspicion regarding that person’s citizenship has arisen. The decision therefore recognises a presumption in favour of the validity of electoral rolls, reflected in Rule 21-A and reinforced by Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act. That presumption may be displaced only where there is material on record indicating the source of the doubt. Once such material is produced, the elector may be called upon to provide an explanation or evidence sufficient to dispel it. The presumption thus operates by treating persons whose names appear on the electoral roll as citizens, unless the objector or the State can point to material that creates a legally cognisable doubt to the contrary.

As the petitioners in ADR v ECI argued, the present SIR reverses this evidentiary sequence. Instead of requiring the State or objector to identify the material basis for doubting a particular elector’s citizenship, the SIR casts blanket suspicion on all electors unless they can prove otherwise through a prescribed list of documents. That list, notably, excludes past electoral rolls. Put simply, the SIR treats everyone as a suspect citizen – no matter their past appearance on electoral rolls – and makes it the responsibility of each person to prove

In ADR v ECI, the Court performs a sleight of hand. It formally affirms the presumption of validity attaching to electoral rolls, but qualifies it as a “rebuttable” evidentiary rule. On this basis – with a huge logical leap – the SIR is read as operating within the framework of a rebuttable presumption of the citizenship of those appearing in electoral rolls, and hence held as constitutional. This reasoning is internally incoherent, and leads directly to alarming consequences.

A rebuttable presumption is one that may be displaced by evidence. In the context of electoral rolls, this means that some material must first be produced to cast doubt on the citizenship of a particular elector. The SIR, however, does not require the State to produce any such evidence. It does not begin with an individualised doubt grounded in material on record. Instead, it proceeds from a blanket doubt that applies to all electors. In doing so, it does not rebut the presumption; it pre-empts it altogether.

How, then, does the Court conclude that the SIR remains compatible with the presumption? Its reasoning rests on two interconnected moves. First, the Court characterises the SIR as an “inquisitorial exercise” necessary for en masse verification, rather than as an adjudication of citizenship itself. This is presented as a “principled distinction” of powers (¶174): the inquiry is said to be confined to the preparation and correction of electoral rolls, not to the final determination of citizenship. In doing so, the Court attempts to distinguish Lal Babu Hussein, which it reads as confined to the question of adjudication of objections to the inclusion of names in the electoral roll, from the present case of an inquisitorial exercise of verification (¶114). In the Court’s reasoning, while the presumption may attach to an existing entry in an adjudicatory setting based on a specific dispute, an intensive re-examination is a different matter altogether. (¶115)

Secondly, the Court appears satisfied that the self-initiated enumeration process contains adequate procedural safeguards, including the calling upon of electors to furnish such supporting material (¶119) and providing opportunity for excluded electors to present their case. For the Court, these procedural safeguards are shaped by presumption of validity, to ensure that “existing entries are not lightly disturbed and that any action affecting them is supported by due process and cogent material”, without precluding a process of verification altogether.

This reasoning is incomplete, and ultimately incoherent. Neither the characterisation of the exercise as inquisitorial nor the existence of procedural safeguards can substitute for the evidentiary presumption of citizenship, that attaches to suffrage. The next two sections tackle these, in turn.

Adjudication of Citizenship

The Court uses the “principled distinction” between inquiry and adjudication to  characterise the ECI’s exercise as mere “administrative satisfaction as to eligibility for enrolment” in the electoral rolls. The inquiry is read to be necessarily “prima facie and contextual” – its consequences limited to the individual’s right to participate in the electoral process. Paragraph 176 sums up the position in the following words:

“It does not amount to a declaration that the individual is not a citizen of India; it merely reflects the Commission’s inability to be satisfied, for electoral purposes, that the statutory conditions are met.”

The Court’s reasoning on both the nature and the extent of this power is logically incoherent. While other commentators have critiqued this reasoning (see here and here), two aspects are worth flagging. When the “statutory conditions” being doubted by the Election Commission is the very fact of the citizenship of the voter, it is farcical to claim that exclusion from the SIR has no declaratory effect whatsoever. Indeed, by the Court’s own directions, it is this very declaration of doubt that flows directly into the adjudication of citizenship – in cases where the Commission is unable to be satisfied that the statutory condition of citizenship is met, it must refer these individuals to “the competent authority within the Central Government” for adjudication of their citizenship status (¶178). When the “inquisitorial” process becomes the mandatory trigger for the “adjudicative” process, the conceptual distinction between the two becomes a line drawn in sand.

Notably, the Court remains silent on how the Lal Babu Hussein presumption would apply to the adjudication proceedings before the “Competent authority”. When the reference to the adjudication process itself expresses a prima facie doubt as to the citizenship of the person so referred, the presumption of validity of the electoral rolls is pre-empted entirely – procedees will once again carry the burden of producing documents and evidence in support of citizenship, while no material information gathered through a legal process of inquiry is required to be produced in support of the suspicion against them. In this way, the Court, while claiming to distinguish the Lal Babu Hussein presumption by confining its application to adjudicatory processes, ends up denying it altogether.

Second, while hearing the challenge to the West Bengal SIR, the Supreme Court directed the establishment of Appellate Tribunals to hear appeals of 27 lakh persons who have been excluded from the final SIR list. The nature of proceedings before these Appellate Tribunals belies this claim of mere “inquisitorial” processes – at least insofar as the West Bengal SIR is similar to that conducted in Bihar. Appellate Tribunals are presided over by retired High Court judges who hear arguments before delivering a verdict. Lawyers appointed by the ECI appear before these tribunals, and actively oppose appeals. Further, Appellate Tribunals are hearing not only applications for inclusion by persons excluded, but also Form 7 appeals filed by persons objecting to the inclusion of others. (See the Supreme Court’s order dt. 01.04.2026 in Mostari Banu v Election Commission of India). Ultimately, this renders the Court’s attempt to distinguish Lal Babu Hussein, on the ground that the earlier judgement was concerned with adjudication of objections to the inclusion of names, and not with a systemic verification exercise, completely hollow (¶112-114). With the judgement in the constitutional challenge to the SIR in West Bengal yet to be pronounced; one can only speculate whether the Court will continue to justify its characterisation of the SIR of a mere “inquisitorial” process, rather than a quasi-judicial determination.

Procedural Safeguards

Procedural safeguards, in the adjudication of citizenship, are meaningful only when they operationalise the presumption of validity of citizenship status. In Lal Babu Hussein, the Court expressly linked the right to a fair hearing to the right to be informed of the grounds on which one is suspected to be a foreigner:

“If the opportunity of being heard before deletion of the name is to be a meaningful and purposive one, it goes without saying that the person concerned whose name is borne on the roll and is intended to be removed must be informed why a suspicion has arisen in regard to his status as a citizen of India, so that he may be able to show that the basis for the suspicion is ill founded.”

The point, therefore, is not merely that an elector must be given a hearing before exclusion or proposed deletion – the procedural threshold that the Court has deemed satisfactory. Rather, the point is that the hearing is meaningful only if the elector is first told why doubt has arisen in their case. Without disclosure of the material basis for that doubt, the elector is left to disprove an unspecified suspicion. Such a process does not implement a rebuttable presumption; it reverses the burden of proof entirely.

Ultimately, the Court glosses over this reasoning entirely. Instead, it concludes that the presumption is “at its core, an evidentiary presumption” that facilitates administrative and adjudicatory processes, and that such “a presumption cannot be elevated into a rule of substantive law that forecloses enquiry.” (¶112) Thus, it finds that “the presumption continues to operate, but it does not obviate the possibility of verification.” (¶119). At which stages and through what specific procedure this presumption continues to operate, the Court does not specify.

The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the SIR conforms to the presumption is not merely logically incoherent; it is also a dangerous mischaracterisation of the nature of the exercise. Contrary to the Court’s characterisation, the SIR does not operate as a limited verification process that preserves the presumption while allowing it to be rebutted in appropriate cases. The Election Commission’s admitted position is more candid. The Commission relies on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, read with case law under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 – an onerous reverse-onus with a colonial lineage traceable back to the Foreigners Act, 1857 – to invoke a legal framework under which the burden of proof shifts onto the person suspected of being a foreigner, en masse. Put simply, despite the Election Commission’s admission that the SIR treats every potential elector as a suspected foreigner, the Court proceeds to confer it with (a veneer of) constitutionality.

What after the SIR?

ADR v ECI opens a Pandora’s box of problems, compounding the precarity of the crores excluded from the SIR. These may broadly be categorised into two groups: those relating to the proposed citizenship adjudication mechanism and those relating to the referral the ECI is directed to make.

The mechanism for citizenship adjudication

The proposed scheme for citizenship adjudication envisioned by the Court runs immediately into a host of issues, both practical and legal (¶178). Firstly, the “Competent Authority” under the Citizenship Act envisioned by the Court for adjudicating citizenship simply does not exist in law. The Citizenship Act does not contain any provisions relating to adjudication of citizenship, save in the very limited context of Section 9(2) (“termination of citizenship upon acquisition of another nationality”) which does not apply to individuals excluded from the SIR. Citizenship, as the Supreme Court has held (and as Surya Kant, CJI. has himself reiterated), is the “right to have rights” – the prerequisite that leads to gaining legal status and other sociopolitical rights in a country. If the Central Government (through this “Competent Authority”) were to adjudicate upon this important legal right, it would be impermissibly exercising judicial power and acting as a tribunal, not an executive body (see Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala). As the Supreme Court has consistently held, adjudicatory tribunals cannot be created by mere executive fiat or judicial directions without statutory backing (see A.P.D. Jain Pathshala v. Shivaji Bhagwat More). There is no statutory basis for citizenship adjudication by a government authority in Indian law.

Secondly, even if a statutory mechanism for citizenship adjudication existed, the rule of law demands that the authority making this determination must enjoy decisional autonomy.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disputes regarding legal rights must be decided by judges who are independent, impartial and cannot be influenced by the executive – particularly in cases where the State is a party (see Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association). The SIR judgement instead envisions adjudication by a “competent authority within the Central Government” (see ¶178) which ignores all of these institutional safeguards, endowing the Central Government with judicial functions that are ordinarily a matter for civil courts, allowing it to potentially find its own evidence as sufficient rebuttal.

Thirdly, this direction replaces the statutory scheme for dealing with suspected illegal foreigners – an occupied legislative field in which judicial encroachments are unwarranted. While the Citizenship Act, 1955 does not prescribe any authority to decide disputes on nationality, the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 contains its own procedure for dealing with illegal immigrants. Section 21 of the Act provides that a person who enters into any area in India without a valid passport or other travel documents shall be punishable with imprisonment or a fine. If the State believes a person has entered into India illegally, the Act requires initiation of criminal proceedings against them which must be adjudicated by an appropriate court. If the nationality of the accused person is disputed, it must be treated as one of the constituent elements of the crime, to be judicially determined after proper appreciation of evidence. As discussed in the following section, the Supreme Court ignores this statutory mechanism, replacing it with a scheme based on executive discretion which ignores important legal safeguards.

The referral made by the ECI

The reference mechanism envisioned by the Court casts a shadow of doubt upon the citizenship of every person excluded from the SIR, one which is without legal basis. As the Court rightly observes, inability to conclusively prove that one is a valid voter does not lead to a presumption of foreignness. Since the ECI’s inquiry is, per its own admission, for the limited purpose of creating accurate electoral rolls, there is no reason this decision should have any bearing on citizenship status. However, the judgement belies this “principled distinction” (see ¶174) by creating a direct pipeline from this “inquisitorial exercise” to a citizenship adjudication process.

This pipeline is particularly dangerous when we observe how it has previously played out in the state of Assam. In 1997, the ECI undertook a revision of the electoral rolls in Assam and marked voters whose citizenship it could not conclusively ascertain as “doubtful voters” (commonly referred to as D-voters). Over 2.44 lakh people were marked as D-voters and referred to Foreigners Tribunals set up in the state, where they faced a decades-long legal battle to prove their citizenship. While the institutionalised arbitrariness and due process violations within these Tribunals have been extensively documented, the legal provisions which enable these violations also deserve scrutiny. Particularly, Section 16 of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 (section 9 of the erstwhile Foreigners Act, 1946) which states that where a question arises regarding an individual’s citizenship status, the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner will lie upon them. If past experience is any indicator, any adjudication process following the SIR is likely to impose this reverse burden of proof on those excluded from the lists, as has been done in Assam.

In the context of citizenship adjudication, the Court has held that the State must show that there is prima facie reason to suspect that the person facing inquiry may not be an Indian citizen. This position was explicitly upheld by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Rahim Ali v. State of Assam, stating that before making a reference which initiates the citizenship adjudication process:

“ …(T)he question is that does Section 9 of the Act empower the Executive to pick a person at random, knock at his/her/their door, tell him/her/they/them ‘We suspect you of being a foreigner’, and then rest easy basis Section 9?…. First, it is for the authorities concerned to have in their knowledge or possession, some material basis or information to suspect that a person is a foreigner and not an Indian.”

Here, the fallout of the farcical “principled distinction” forming the core of the Bihar SIR judgement becomes most apparent. The pipeline created by the Supreme Court from SIR exclusion to citizenship adjudication completely disregards the law laid down in Rahim Ali. The ECI, according to its own submissions, never undertook an exercise to collect materials based on which an individual’s citizenship might be disputed. By directing the ECI to refer “doubtful voters” for citizenship adjudication, the Supreme Court has sought to replace the Rahim Ali safeguards with the sheer ECI discretion on the inclusion of voters. This eliminates the State’s duty to prove foundational facts, as even in the SIR process, the onus of appearing before authorities and producing documents was placed on the individual. As the Supreme Court observed in Rahim Ali, a person accused of being a foreigner would generally not be able to prove the negative, if they are not made aware of the evidence against them which led to them being labelled as suspect. The SIR judgement envisions a process where this evidence does not exist at all.

Conclusion

To reiterate, the Election Commission has not, at any stage of the SIR process, disclosed any material basis for suspecting the citizenship of individual electors. In the absence of such material, exclusion from the electoral roll cannot itself become the ground for doubting nationality. To permit that move would be to transform an administrative consequence into proof of the very condition of foreignness that the administration was required to establish in the first place.

The effects of such a process are not merely formal. On the ground, the burden of documentation is likely to fall most heavily on those least able to discharge it. Large sections of the population do not possess the documents now treated as necessary (but never sufficient) to establish citizenship. As has been extensively documented, the documentary demands of citizenship often operate in a context where access to documents is deeply unequal, along lines of gender, caste, migration and poverty. Emerging accounts already suggest that the consequences of the SIR are not confined to electoral roll exclusion. Deletion from the voter list has undeniable spill-over effects into other domains of civic life, including denial of passports applications, and access to public benefits.

This is unsurprising, as citizenship is both an instrument and object of social closure, and one of its formal institutions is universal suffrage (See Rogers Brubaker, 1992). Control over the roll is, in effect, control over the terms of democratic belonging. The point of democratic constitutionalism is precisely to discipline that power. Where the State seeks to determine who belongs to the political community, its actions must be governed by the rule of law, due process, and equal citizenship. The Court’s deference in ADR v ECI sanctions the very opposite.

Simultaneity and Constitutional Accommodation: A Comment on the Proposed One Nation One Election Bill September 29, 2026